Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identi…es the speci…c nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. JEL Classi…cation: D7.
Introduction
Consider a society with n agents who have to collectively choose one alternative from a given set of social alternatives. Assume that this set is endowed with a natural strict order because alternatives have a common characteristic according to which pairs of alternatives can be compared in an objective way. For instance, the set of alternatives may consist of physical locations (a public facility on a road or street), properties of a political project in terms of its left-right characteristics, the expenditure level on a public good, indexes re ‡ecting the quality of a product, feasible temperatures in a room, and so on. 1 In all these cases, and in many others, this linear order structure permits to identify the set of alternatives with a subset of the real line. Agents have (potentially di¤erent) preferences on the set of alternatives. Black (1948) is the …rst to suggest that, given the linear order on the set of alternatives, agents'preferences ought to be singlepeaked. The preference of an agent is single-peaked if there exists an alternative (called the top) which is strictly preferred to any other alternative and on each side of the top the preference is strictly monotonic, increasing on its left and decreasing on its right.
2
Society would like to select an alternative according to agents' preferences. But since they constitute private information, agents have to be asked about them. A social choice function on a domain of preferences requires each agent to report a preference and associates an alternative with the reported preference pro…le. Hence, a social choice function on a Cartesian product domain induces an (ordinal) direct revelation game where each agent's set of strategies is his set of possible preferences. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no agent has ever incentives to strategically misrepresent his preference; in other words, truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the direct revelation game induced by the social choice function. Moulin (1980) characterizes the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences as the set of generalized median voter schemes.
3 A generalized median voter scheme is, in general, a non-anonymous ex-1 There is an extensive literature studying collective choice problems where the set of social alternatives is a linearly ordered set. See Moulin (1980) , for instance. This class of problems also plays a fundamental role in Sprumont (1995) and Barberà (2001 Barberà ( , 2010 , three excellent surveys on strategyproofness. 2 The set of single-peaked preferences is extremely large and rich; for instance, for each alternative there are many single-peaked preferences that have as top this alternative. Moreover, no a priori restriction is imposed on how pairs of alternatives lying in di¤erent sides of the top are ordered. Ballester and Haeringer (2010) identify two properties that are both necessary and su¢ cient to characterize the domain of single-peaked preference pro…les. 3 A social choice function is tops-only if the chosen alternative only depends on the pro…le of tops. tension of the median voter. It can be interpreted as a particular way of distributing the power to in ‡uence the social outcome among all coalitions of agents. In addition, Moulin (1980) also identi…es the two nested subclasses of strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous social choice functions, and strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and e¢ cient social choice functions. 4 The ranges of all functions in Moulin (1980) 's characterizations are closed intervals. This implies that if some alternatives were banned or infeasible, either the social choice function would have to request from the agents more information than just their tops, or there would be a single-peaked preference pro…le and an agent with incentives to misreport his preferences. In many applications however, the domain of preferences can be restricted even further because the linear order structure of the set of alternatives conveys to agents' preferences more than just an ordinal content. Often, an agent's preference on the set of alternatives is responsive also to the notion of distance, embedding to the preference its corresponding property of symmetry. A single-peaked preference is symmetric if the following additional condition holds: an alternative is strictly preferred to another one if and only if the former is strictly closer to the top. If an indi¤erence class contains two alternatives then both are located in opposite sides of the top and are at the same distance of the top.
5
To restrict further the domain of a social choice function is equivalent to shrink the set of agents' strategies in its induced direct revelation game. Thus, strategies that were dominant remain dominant while strategies that were not dominant in the larger domain may become dominant after the domain reduction. Therefore, two important facts hold. First, any strategy-proof social choice function on a domain remains strategyproof on all of its subdomains. Second, a manipulable social choice function on a domain may become strategy-proof in a smaller subdomain. 6 Hence, we ask whether the set Tops-only social choice functions are especially simple in terms of the amount of information they require about individual preferences. Ching (1997) gives an alternative description and several axiomatic characterizations of generalized median voter schemes; in particular, Ching (1997) shows that in Moulin (1980) 's characterization tops-onlyness can be replaced by continuity.
of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences, identi…ed by Moulin (1980) as the class of generalized median voter schemes, becomes larger when the domain of preferences where we want the social choice functions to operate is the subdomain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. We answer this question a¢ rmatively by completely identifying the larger class of functions that emerge after restricting further the domain.
The new class of social choice functions can be described as generalized median voter schemes disturbed by discontinuity jumps. A social choice function f in the class coincides with a generalized median voter scheme except that at some (countable number of) discontinuity jumps (for instance, an interval (a; b) with midpoint d), instead of taking the value prescribed by the generalized median voter scheme, f takes the constant value a at [a; d); either the value a or b at d, and the constant value b at (d; b]. Our description of the class makes precise that the choice of either a or b at any of those pro…les where the generalized median voter scheme would choose d must be monotonic in order to preserve strategy-proofness of the social choice function.
We want to stress the importance for applications of admitting discontinuous social choice functions that are non-onto because they have a disconnected range, and this range can in fact be any closed subset of alternatives. Besides, this range can be chosen beforehand. Non-onto social choice functions are indispensable for the design of social choice functions that require that some subsets of alternatives are never chosen due to feasibility constraints. For instance when the range of the function has to be …nite, or not all locations for a public facility are possible, or the set of indexes re ‡ecting the quality of a product must be disconnected, or the thermostat controlling for the temperature in a room can not take all values, and so on. In all these cases, and in many others, discontinuities can not be regarded as pathological features of social choice functions but rather as indispensable requirements to deal with constraints on the set of feasible alternatives to be chosen. 7 that voting by committees is the class of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on both, the domain of separable preferences as well as on the subdomain of additive preferences, although the set of additive preferences is strictly smaller than the set of separable preferences. No new strategy-proof social choice function appears after the domain reduction in this case. Second, given a tops-only social choice function on the domain of single-peaked preferences, the set of agents'strategies in its induced direct revelation game is smaller when single-peaked preferences are further restricted to be symmetric because the fact that the rule is constant (by tops-onlyness) in a large subset of pro…les is unrelated with the fact that the set of preferences that agents may use to evaluate the outcomes of the social choice function is smaller.
There is a large literature studying strategy-proofness on domains related to singlepeakedness. Border and Jordan (1983) extend Moulin (1980) 's results to multi-dimensional environments. One of the domains they consider is the set of quadratic separable preferences that coincides with the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences when the number of dimensions is equal to one. However, Border and Jordan (1983) only consider social choice functions that respect unanimity (i.e., if all agents have the same top then the common top should be chosen). Hence, all their results apply only to social choice functions whose ranges coincide with the set of alternatives. In particular, they show that for the one-dimensional case strategy-proof social choice functions that respect unanimity on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences are uncompromising, 8 and the partial converse that all uncompromising social choice functions are strategy-proof; moreover, all uncompromising social choice functions on this domain are continuous. Puppe (2007a, 2007b ) study strategy-proofness in rich domains satisfying a general notion of single-peakedness based on abstract betweenness relations. However, their richness condition explicitly excludes as an admitted domain the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences since it requires that for any triple of alternatives (y; x; z) with y not being between x and z there must exist a preference relation in the domain with top on x such that z is strictly preferred to y. Thus, their results and ours are logically unrelated. Our result and its proof are closely related to the following papers. Theorem 1 partly retains the structure of Moulin (1980) 's characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions under the single-peaked domain of preferences. Our result in Theorem 1 says that strategy-proof social choice functions on the symmetric single-peaked domain that are manipulable on the larger single-peaked domain consists of generalized median voter schemes that are perturbed by speci…c discontinuities. Our result is also related to Theorem 3 in Barberà and Jackson (1994) characterizing all strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Their characterization includes social choice functions whose range is not an interval; however, the characterization is open because it relies on a family of tie-breaking rules (used to select between the two extremes of the discontinuity jumps) that are not fully described. Our characterization is closed because it explicitly describes the exact family of admissible tie-breaking rules needed to preserve strategy-proofness. Yet, we are able to provide this closed description because our domain contains only symmetric preferences. The proof of our result relays at some point on Berga and Serizawa (2000) 's characterization of all strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on a minimally rich domain as the class of generalized median voter schemes; 9 we use their result in the easier case when the given strategy-proof social choice function is continuous. In addition, our proof is substantially simpler than it would have been if we were not able to use Barberà et al. (2010) result identifying conditions of preference domains under which (individual) strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness. Their result allows us to avoid many steps of individual changes of preferences by instead moving simultaneously the preferences of all members of a given coalition. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present preliminary notations and the most basic de…nitions. In Section 3 we state some previous results and give the main de…nitions and intuitions in order to understand why and how the class of generalized median voter schemes has to be enlarged in order to identify the full class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. In Section 4 we state and prove our main result characterizing the complete class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences (Theorem 1). After presenting some preliminaries of the proof in Subsection 4.2, we prove Theorem 1 in Subsection 4.3. In Section 5 we …rst state as corollaries of Theorem 1 the corresponding characterizations under strategy-proofness and anonymity (Corollary 1) and under strategy-proofness, anonymity and e¢ ciency (Corollary 2). We then argue about the importance for applications of allowing for non-onto social choice functions which were ruled out by the combination of strategy-proofness and tops-onlyness in Moulin (1980) 's characterization under single-peaked preferences and state Corollary 3 characterizing all strategy-proof social choice functions that are e¢ cient relative to a given closed set of feasible alternatives. We …nish with the remark that, as the consequence of the main result in Barberà et al. (2010) , the four statements hold if we replace in them strategy-proofness by group strategy-proofness. 9 A domain is minimally rich if (i) it is a subset of the single-peaked domain, (ii) for each alternative x there is a preference relation in the domain with top at x, and (iii) for any pair of alternatives x and y (x 6 = y) there is a preference in the domain that strictly orders x and y and whose top lies between x and y. Obviously, the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences is a minimally rich domain.
Preliminary notations and de…nitions
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the set of agents of a society that has to choose an alternative x from the interval [0; 1].
10 Subset of agents will be denoted by capital letters (like S) and their cardinalities by their corresponding small letters (like s). The preference of each agent i 2 N on the set of alternatives [0; 1] is a complete, re ‡exive, and transitive binary relation (a complete preorder) R i on [0; 1]. Let R be the set of complete preorders on [0; 1]. A preference pro…le R = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 R n is a n-tuple of preferences. To emphasize the role of agent i or subset of agents T , a preference pro…le R will be represented by (R i ; R i ) or (R T ; R T ), respectively. As usual, let P i and I i denote the strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by R i , respectively. Given R i 2 R, the top of R i (if any) is the unique alternative t(R i ) that is strictly preferred to any other alternative; i.e., t(
Given a subset of preferences S R, a social choice function (SCF from now on) f on S is a function f : S n ! [0; 1] selecting an alternative for each preference pro…le in S n . We will refer to this Cartesian product set S n (or to the set S itself) as the domain of preferences. Given a SCF f : S n ! [0; 1], denote its range by r f ; i.e.,
We will be interested in SCFs that induce truth-telling as a (weakly) dominant strategy in their associated (ordinal) direct revelation game.
T . We will also consider other properties of SCFs. A SCF f : S n ! [0; 1] is anonymous if it is invariant with respect to the agents'names; namely, for all one-to-one mappings : N ! N and all R 2 S n , f (R 1 ; :::; R n ) = f (R (1) ; :::;
is e¢ cient if for all R 2 S n , there is no z 2 [0; 1] such that, for all i 2 N , zR i f (R) and
any subset of preferences with the property that for each x 2 [0; 1] there exists at least one preference R i 2 S such that t(R i ) = x: Then, S n is called a rich domain and with some abuse of notation, given a tops-only SCF f : S n ! [0; 1] we will refer to it by its corresponding voting scheme f :
In many applications, a linear order structure on the set of alternatives naturally induces a domain restriction in which there always exists a top, and at each of the sides of the top the preference is strictly monotonic.
(1) there exists the top t(R i ) of R i , and
Let SP be the set of single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]. Observe that, given a singlepeaked preference R i 2 SP, yP i x may hold even if jt(R i ) xj < jt(R i ) yj; but then, x and y are necessarily located in di¤erent sides of the top t(R i ). Often, the linear order structure of the set of alternatives and a distance conveys to the preference a symmetric property around the top (coming for instance, from a location interpretation of the set of alternatives) that naturally induces the restriction that preferences respond to the distance as follows.
Obviously, a symmetric single-peaked preference is single-peaked. Let SSP be the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]. Given any alternative x 2 [0; 1], there is a unique symmetric single-peaked preference R i with its top t(R i ) = x (SSP is a rich domain). Hence, there is a one-to-one mapping between the set of symmetric single-peaked preferences SSP and the set of alternatives [0; 1]. Thus, we will use t i 2 [0; 1] to identify the (unique) R i 2 SSP such that t(R i ) = t i and t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) to denote the corresponding symmetric single-peaked preference pro…le R = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) such that t(R i ) = t i for all i 2 N . Note that, by this one-to-one identi…cation, any SCF f : SSP n ! [0; 1] is tops-only. Thus, we will also denote a SCF f :
by its corresponding voting scheme f : [0; 1] n ! [0; 1]. Following Berga and Serizawa (2000) a subset S SP is a minimally rich domain if it is rich and for any pair of alternatives x; y 2 [0; 1], x 6 = y, there exists R i 2 S such that xP i y and t(R i ) 2 (minfx; yg; maxfx; yg). Observe that SSP n is a minimally rich domain.
3 Previous results and main intuition 3.1 Previous results Moulin (1980) characterizes the family of strategy-proof and tops-only SCFs on the domain of single-peaked preferences as well as its anonymous subfamily. 12 The two characterizations are useful to develop helpful intuitions to understand our characterization of strategy-proof SCFs (and its anonymous subfamily) on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. To state them, we need to de…ne the median of an odd set of numbers and the notion of a monotonic family of …xed ballots. Given a set of odd real numbers fx 1 ; :::; x K g, de…ne its median as medfx 1 ; :::; x K g = y, where y is such that
; observe that since K is odd the median belongs to the set fx 1 ; :::; x K g and it is unique. A collection fp S g S22 N is a monotonic family of …xed ballots if p S 2 [0; 1] for all S 2 2 N and T Q implies
is strategy-proof, tops-only and anonymous if and only if there exist n + 1 …xed ballots 0 p n ::: p 0 0 such that for all R 2 SP n , f (R) = medft(R 1 ); :::; t(R n ); p n ; :::; p 0 g:
is strategy-proof and tops-only if and only if there exists a monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N such that for all R 2 SP n ,
The SCFs identi…ed in Propositions 1 and 2 are called median voter schemes and generalized median voter schemes, respectively. A simple way of interpreting them is as follows. Each generalized median voting scheme (and its associated monotonic family of …xed ballots) can be understood as a particular way of distributing the power among coalitions to in ‡uence the social choice. To see that, take an arbitrary coalition S and its …xed ballot p S . Then, coalition S can make sure that, by all of its members reporting a top alternative below p S , the social choice will be at most p S , independently of the reported top alternatives of the members of the complementary coalition.
13 An alternative way of describing this distribution of power among coalitions is as follows. Fix a monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N (i.e., a generalized median voter scheme) and take a vector of tops (t(R 1 ); :::; t(R n )): Start at the left extreme of the interval and push the outcome to the right until it reaches an alternative x for which the following two things happen simultaneously: (i) there exists a coalition of agents S such that all its members have reported a top alternative below or equal to x (i.e., t(R i ) x for all i 2 S) and (ii) the …xed ballot p S associated to S is located also below x (i.e., p S x). Median voter schemes are the anonymous subclass of generalized median voter schemes. Hence, the …xed ballots of any two coalitions with the same cardinality of any anonymous generalized median voter scheme are equal. From a monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N associated to an anonymous generalized median voter scheme f we can identify the n + 1 ballots p n p n 1 ::: p 0 needed to describe f as a median voter scheme as follows: for each 0 s n, p s = p S for all S 2 2 N such that #S = s. Moreover, if n is odd the (ordinary) median voter is obtained by choosing p n = ::: = p n+1 2 = 0 and p n+1 2 1 = ::: = p 0 = 1 since for any R 2 SP n , medft(R 1 ); :::; t(R n ); p n ; :::; p 0 g = medft(R 1 ); :::; t(R n ); 0; :::; 0 | {z } Finally, the SCF f where agent j 2 N is the dictator (i.e., for all R 2 SP n , f (R) = t(R j )) can be described as a generalized median voter scheme by setting p T = 0 for all T N such that j 2 T and p S = 1 for all S N such that j = 2 S: Then, for any R 2 SP n , maxft(R j ); p fjg g = t(R j ), for any T N such that j 2 T; t(R j ) max i2T ft(R i ); p T g; and for any S N such that j = 2 S, max i2S ft(R i ); p S g = 1: Thus,
Moulin (1980) also shows that the class of group strategy-proof and tops-only SCFs on the domain of single-peaked preferences coincides with the set of generalized median voter schemes. From the main result in Barberà et al. (2010) we can conclude that any strategy-proof SCF on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences is group strategy-proof as well. Since we will later use this fact we state it here as a remark. To see that in the statements of Propositions 1 and 2 tops-onlyness does not follow from strategy-proofness consider the SCF f : SP n ! [0; 1] where for all R 2 SP n ,
Notice that f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not tops-only. It also violates e¢ ciency, unanimity, and ontoness. In the last section of the paper we will describe how our characterization includes this class of SCFs on the domain of symmetric singlepeaked preferences.
Main intuition and de…nitions
Consider Propositions 1 and 2 for the simplest case where n = 1. 
More generally, let S be a subset of SP. A SCF f :
By Proposition 2 the following remark holds. Lemma 1 below states that, for any n 1, any strategy-proof SCF is increasing on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences (observe that tops-only is not required explicitly since for each x 2 [0; 1] there exists a unique R i 2 SSP such that t(R i ) = x).
Proof The statement follows from the iterated application of Claim A.
Proof of Claim A Assume otherwise; that is, there exist t; t 0 2 SSP n and i 2 N such that
We distinguish among six possible cases. The …rst three
contradict strategy-proofness of f since in all three cases i manipulates f at t 0 via t i .
The two cases (iv) t i < t
f (t) contradict strategy-proofness of f since in both cases i manipulates f at t via t
Since t i ; t 0 i 2 SSP and f is strategy-proof,
Adding up,
a contradiction with (2).
We have shown that the monotonicity of strategy-proof SCFs is preserved when we restrict the domain of single-peaked preferences to be symmetric. However, continuity (of its corresponding voting scheme) does not follow from strategy-proofness and topsonlyness in this smaller domain. Indeed, a special class of discontinuities may arise. It is very easy to understand why when n = 1: First, take any ; 2 (0; 1) such that minf ; 1 g and de…ne the SCFs f :
where for each t i 2 SSP,
In Figure 2 we depict f . Both f and f + are strategy-proof on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. At any t i 2 SSP such that either t i > or t i < agent i can not manipulate them. Let t i 2 SSP be such that t i = : Then, ( )I i ( + ) since ( ) and ( + ) are at the same distance to : The function f :
Observe that neither f nor f + are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preferences since, for instance, for = 1=2, = 1=4, and any R i 2 SP such that t(R i ) = 3=8 and 3=4P i 1=4 agent i manipulates f and f More generally, a strategy-proof SCF f : SSP ! [0; 1] could have a countable number of discontinuities as long as the midpoint of each discontinuity jump is the discontinuity point itself; namely, for the point d 2 [0; 1] where f is discontinuous at d,
2 must hold, otherwise, f is not strategy-proof. Thus, discontinuity jumps have to be symmetric around the discontinuity point.
As we will show in Section 4, the class of strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences is the class of generalized median voter schemes identi…ed by Moulin (1980) plus the SCFs obtained after perturbing each generalized median voter scheme by admitting these very particular kind of discontinuities. We will call them disturbed minmax. Formally, De…nition 4 Let fp S g S22 N be a monotonic family of …xed ballots. A collection of open intervals I = fI m g m2M , where M is an indexation set, is a family of discontinuity jumps compatible with fp S g S22 N if:
(1) M is countable, and we preliminary perturb the identity function as follows. 
Let I be a family of discontinuity jumps compatible with the monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N . A possible perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme associated to fp S g S22 N that preserves its strategy-proofness in the symmetric singlepeaked domain is as follows: for each t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 SSP n , f (t 1 ; :::; t n ) = I ( min
We will show that these perturbed functions (of generalized median voter schemes) are the basis to characterize the class of all strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Figure 3 illustrates the perturbation for the case n = 1, M = fmg and I = fI m = (a m ; b m )g; i.e., f (t) = I (medft; p 1 ; p 0 g). b m , the perturbed median voter scheme would still be strategy-proof. When n = 1, there are just two ways of perturbing the generalized median voter scheme at each discontinuity jump while preserving its strategy-proofness. When n > 1 the process of assigning values to the discontinuity points in a way that maintains strategy-proofness is more complex. Figure 4 illustrates the perturbation of an anonymous SCF for the case n = 2, M = fmg; I = fI m g and 0 < p 2 < a m < d m < b m < p 1 < p 0 < 1; i.e., f (t 1 ; t 2 ) = I (medft 1 ; t 2 ; p 2 ; p 1 ; p 0 g). The tops of the two agents are measured on the axes and in bold-italic is represented the value of the SCF in each region. The bold line indicates the discontinuity points of the SCF.
It is easy to see that if I had assigned the value b m ; instead of a m ; to d m the perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme would still have remained strategyproof on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. But now there are more ways of assigning values to the discontinuity points that preserve the strategy-proofness of f . For the particular case depicted in Figure 4 , the SCF would have remained strategyproof and anonymous if it had assigned the value a m to the points in the set B 1 = f(t 1 ; t 2 ) 2 [0; 1] 2 j 0 t 1 < d m and t 2 = d m g, as well as to the points in the set would violate strategy-proofness because at any pro…le (t 1 ; d m ) with 0 < t 1 < d m agent 1 could manipulate the SCF via t 0 1 = d m . Intuitively, the perturbation of the generalized median voter scheme should preserve the increasing monotonicity of the SCF; otherwise, some agent could manipulate it at some pro…le. We next formalize all these possibilities.
Consider a generalized median voter scheme with its associated monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N . Let I = fI m g m2M be a family of discontinuity jumps compatible with fp S g S22 N , and assume M 6 = ?. Fix m 2 M and de…ne
namely, D m is the set of symmetric single-peaked preference pro…les at which the generalized median voter scheme will select d m and thus the corresponding perturbation function I will generate a discontinuity point. We refer to any set D m as a discontinuity set. We want to determine the shape of the discontinuity sets because, in order to maintain strategy-proofness, we must preserve the increasing monotonicity of the function. To do that we need to track the agents with tops strictly below, equal, and strictly above d m : Note that, since no …xed ballot belongs to any discontinuity jump, if t 2 D m then there is at least one agent i 2 N such that t i = d m .
For each t 2 D m de…ne the vector of extreme votes ev m (t) = (ev m 1 (t); :::; ev m n (t)) 2 f0; d m ; 1g n ; where for each i 2 N ,
The vector ev m (t) describes at the pro…le t the location of the top of each agent relative to d m (0 if it is strictly below, 1 if it is strictly above, and
describes all the extreme votes at which d m is chosen by the generalized median voter scheme associated to the monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N . Notice that since min S22 N max i2S ft i ; p S g = d m , if we reallocate the tops below d m to 0, and the tops above d m to 1, the minmax is not a¤ected. Therefore, min S22 N max i2S ft i ; p S g = d m = min S22 N max i2S fev m i (t); p S g: We now turn to describe how strategy-proof SCFs on the symmetric single-peaked domain may choose between a m and b m at those pro…les that induce a discontinuity at
. De…ne the preorder on R n as follows: for all x; x 0 2 R n , 
By convention, set U (?) = ?. Now, given X m EV (D m ) with the property that
The functions g Xm cover all di¤erent ways of assigning values a m and b m to the preference pro…les that generate a discontinuity point at d m preserving the monotonicity of the perturbation. For each particular m 2 M there are many such functions because there are many subsets X m EV (D m ) with the property that X m = U (X m ). Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fI m g m2M we say that fX m g m2M is a family of tie-breaking sets of M if for all m 2 M , X m EV (D m ) and X m = U (X m ).
Characterization
We are now ready to de…ne disturbed minimax SCFs and state and prove that they constitute the class of all strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
De…nition and statement
De…nition 6 A SCF f : SSP n ! [0; 1] is a disturbed minmax if there exist:
(1) a monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N ;
(2) a family of discontinuity jumps I = fI m g m2M compatible with fp S g S22 N ; and (3) a family of tie-breaking sets fX m g m2M of M such that, for all t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 SSP n ;
Theorem 1 A SCF f : SSP n ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof if and only if it is a disturbed minmax.
Before moving to the proof of Theorem 1 consider again the SCF f de…ned in (1) but restricted to the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, where for all R 2 SSP n ,
Observe that for any R i 2 SSP, 0R i 1 if and only if t(R i )
: It is easy to see that in the domain of single-peaked preferences f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not tops-only. Hence, while it is excluded in Moulin (1980)'s characterization under the domain of single-peaked preferences stated above as Proposition 2, it has the following representation as a disturbed minmax under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Its family of monotonic …xed ballots is ; and the tie-breaking set of M = fmg is X m = fev 2 f0;
Preliminaries of the proof of Theorem 1
We start with some additional notation. Given x 2 [0; 1], S N with s = #S, and t 2 SSP n , de…ne x S (x; :::; x | {z } s times
) and t S (t j ) j2S : Thus, (x S ; t S ) (y 1 ; :::; y n ), where 
We will denote the diagonal function associated to f by f N f . Given t 2 [0; 1] n and x 2 [0; 1], de…ne the subset of pro…les of tops C t;x as:
t i for all i such that x t i and t i t 0 i
x for all i such that t i xg; namely, C t;x is the set of pro…les t 0 with the property that the top t 0 i of each agent i lies between t i and x. Given a SCF f : SSP n ! [0; 1], a subset T SSP n , and x 2 [0; 1] the notation f j T x means that for all t 2 T , f (t) = x: As a consequence of Remark 1 and Lemma 1 the following statements hold.
Remark 3 Let f : SSP n ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. Then, (R3.1) f is unanimous on its range r f ; namely,
1] is strategy-proof; and
The two …rst statements follow from group strategy-proofness (Remark 1) and the last one from monotonicity (Lemma 1) and (R3.1).
We now state and prove the following three lemmata that will be useful in the proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 2 says that the range of a strategy-proof SCF and the range of its associated diagonal function coincide and it is a closed subset of [0; 1] (see also Zhou (1991) ).
Lemma 2 Let f : SSP n ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. Then, r f = r f . Moreover, r f is closed.
Proof By de…nition of f , r f r f . Take x 2 r f . Then, by (R3.1), f (x N ) = x.
Thus, x 2 r f . Let fx k g ! x be such that x k 2 r f for all k 1 and assume x = 2 r f . De…ne y = f (x N ) 6 = x and let x k be such that jx k xj < jy xj.
Lemmata 3 and 3 0 roughly say that if a strategy-proof SCF is constant and equal to x on one variable over some interval containing this constant x, but it is not constant over the whole interval [0; 1], then there is a discontinuity at some point z and the discontinuity leaves indi¤erent the agent with top at z (see Figures 2 and 3 ). In the proof of Theorem 1, z will correspond to the midpoint d m of a discontinuity jump 
Then, there exists z 2 [b;
x+y 2 ] such that f ( ; t i ) is discontinuous at z and
Proof Let i 2 N , x 2 [a; b), and t i 2 SSP n 1 be such that conditions (3.1) and ( 3.2) hold for f . First note that the interval [b;
x+y 2
] is not empty since b then b would be closer to y than to x and for a small enough > 0, i would manipulate
b > x and, by the monotonicity of f , lim t i !z f (t i ; t i ) = x and f j [a;z) ft i g x. We now prove that
, and hence, i would manipulate f at (z ; t i ) via t 0 i = z + . Or f (z + ; t i ) < z , and therefore f (z ; t i ) = x < f (z + ; t i ) < z , and i would manipulate f at (z ; t i ) via t
; t i ) > 0 and hence, i would manipulate f at (z + ; t i ) via z . Thus, lim t i !z + f (t i ; t i ) = 2z x and f ( ; t i ) is discontinuous at z. Now by (R3.3), f j (z;2z x] ft i g 2z x. Finally, by monotonicity of f , 2z x y, and hence, z 2 [b; 
Then, there exists z 2 [ x+y 2
; a] such that f ( ; t i ) is discontinuous at z and
Proof Omitted since it is symmetric to the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to check that any disturbed minmax SCF is strategy-proof on the symmetric single-peaked domain. To see this notice that if f is a disturbed minmax SCF, for all t 2 SSP n ;
Fix a pro…le t 2 SSP n and an agent i 2 N . If t i = min S22 N max j2S ft j ; p S g, then by (5) i cannot bene…t from reporting a di¤erent preference. Suppose that t i < min S22 N max j2S ft j ; p S g (the case t i > min S22 N max j2S ft j ; p S g is symmetric). The only way i can a¤ect the value of the SCF is by reporting a preference t 0 i > min S22 N max j2S ft j ; p S g. Since disturbed minmax SCFs are increasing, f (t 0 i ; t i ) f (t). We distinguish between two cases:
t) t i j and the deviation is not pro…table. Case 2: f (t) < t i < min S22 N max j2S ft j ; p S g. By the de…nition of the disturbed minmax, it must be that f (t) = a m for some m 2 M and a m < t i < min S22 N max j2S ft j ; p S g d m .
Hence, either f (t 0 i ; t i ) = a m = f (t), in which case the deviation is not pro…table, or
jf (t) t i j, and again the deviation is not pro…table.
Thus, any disturbed minmax SCF is strategy-proof.
Let f : SSP n ! [0; 1] be a strategy-proof SCF. To show that f is a disturbed minmax we …rst have to identify its associated monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N , family I = fI m g m2M of discontinuity jumps compatible with fp S g S22 N , and family of tiebreaking sets fX m g m2M of M . Then, we will show that f coincides with the disturbed minmax SCF obtained by (4) in De…nition 6, applied to all of them. For each S 2 2 N , de…ne its associated …xed ballot by setting
i.e., p S is the image of f at the pro…le where all agents in S have their top at 0 and all agents not in S have their top at 1.
f is strategy-proof. Thus, by Lemma 1, f is increasing and hence it has at most a countable number of discontinuities.
17 Denote by fd m g m2M the discontinuity points of Notice that the family of discontinuity jumps I = fI m g m2M is compatible with fp S g S22 N since:
(1) M is countable.
(2) By the monotonicity of f , (4) Finally, by (6) and Lemma 2, for each
In fact,
If M is empty (i.e., f is continuos and its range is equal to [p N ; p ? ]), the statement of Theorem 1 follows because f is a generalized median voter scheme de…ned on the minimally rich domain SSP n (see Theorem 1 in Berga and Serizawa (2000) ).
18
Assume M is non-empty and …x m 2 M . To identify the element X m in the family of tie-breaking sets of M , consider the previously de…ned discontinuity set
the set of pro…les of extreme votes that induce d m through the minmax
18 Observe that all results in Berga and Serizawa (2000) refer only to onto SCFs. Hence, to be more precise with the application of their result, notice that the restriction of SSP on the interval and its associated preorder m . Then, de…ne
By Lemma 1, f is increasing and therefore X m coincides with its upper contour set relative to m ; i.e., X m = U (X m ):
So far we have identi…ed from f the monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N , the family I = fI m g m2M of discontinuity jumps compatible with fp S g S22 N (we are now assuming that M 6 = ?), and the family fX m g m2M of tie-breaking sets of M (and hence, its corresponding family of tie-breaking functions fg Xm : D m ! fa m ; b m gg m2M ). Given all of them, let F be the SCF de…ned by condition (4) in De…nition 6. We want to show that f = F: Let t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 SSP n be arbitrary. To show that f (t) = F (t) de…ne q = min T 22 N max i2T ft i ; p T g. We distinguish among four di¤erent cases relating q, t and f (t).
Case 1: q = 2 ft 1 ; :::; t n g.
To see that observe that if p S < q then max i2S ft i ; p S g < q contradicting the de…nition of q. Further, since q = min T 22 N max i2T ft i ; p T g = 2 ft 1 ; :::; t n g, there exists T 2 2 N , such that p T = q and t j < p T for all j 2 T . But then, T S and, by the monotonicity of p = fp T g T 22 N , p S p T . Therefore, by the de…nition of q, p S = p T = q.
By the de…nition of S and the assumption that q = 2 ft 1 ; :::; t n g, t j > p S for all j = 2 S. Then, t 2 C (0 S ;1 N nS );p S and, by (R3.3) and the de…nition of
Moreover, by (7), p S = 2 [ m2M I m . Hence, by (4) in De…nition 6 and the de…nition of
Case 2: q = t i for some i 2 N and f (t) = t i . If t i = f (t), then t i 2 r f and therefore, by (7), t i = 2 [ m2M I m . By (4) in De…nition 6 and the de…nition of
Case 3: q = t i for some i 2 N , f (t) x 6 = t i and t i = 2 [ m2M fd m g. To show that in this case f (t) = F (t) we proceed in two steps. First we prove that f (t) = f (t N i ) and then we prove that f (t N i ) = F (t).
Step 1:
]. Otherwise, suppose …rst that t i < p S i , and consider T 2 2 N . If T S i , we have that t i < p S i p T , and therefore t i < max j2T ft j ; p T g. If T \ S > i 6 = ;, then by the de…nition of S > i , max j2T ft j ; p T g > t i . Hence, we have a contradiction with
The two cases are symmetric and therefore we omit the proof for the second case (which uses Lemma 3 0 instead of Lemma 3).
. The condition x < f (t N i ) implies x < t i since we are assuming that x 6 = t i holds and if x > t i , then N would manipulate f at t N i via t. By (R3.3), the de…nition of S i and f (t) = x,
On the other hand, since t j < t i p S
; 1], and therefore by (6) and (R3.3),
By Lemma 3, applied to the strategy-proof SCF , there exists z 2 [t i ;
) is discontinuous at z and
Applying (R3.3) again, if 2 (z; 2z x] and t 0 j 2 [t j ; 2z x] 19 for all j 2 S < i , then
Note that z is a discontinuity point of f as well. To see that observe that by (9), f (w N ) = 2z x for all w 2 (z; 2z x]. On the other hand, f (t) = x; and hence, x 2 r f 19 Notice that if j 2 S < i then t j < t i 2z x and therefore the interval is well de…ned.
and by (R3.1), f (x N ) = x. Assume that there existsŵ 2 (x; z) such that f (ŵ
Therefore, f has the property that
This means that f is discontinuous at z and hence there exists m 2 M such that d m = z. Since under Case 3, t i is not a discontinuity point of f , t i 6 = z and therefore, by the de…nition of z, t i < z.
By monotonicity of f and (9), f (t
x for all su¢ ciently small > 0 (in the next paragraph we will …nd an upper bound for such 's). We want to show that the inequality is strict; i.e., f (t
then, since t i < z can be re-written as t i x < 2z x t i , this means that N would manipulate f at t N i via t which contradicts strategy-proofness of f . To sum up, we have shown that if x < f (t
But then it is easy to see that for a small > 0, S i manipulates f at ((z + ) S i ; t
, then (2z x (z + )) < f (t N i ) (z + ) < 2z x (z + ) where the …rst inequality is equivalent to the assumption <
, and the second inequality follows from f (t
which means that S i manipulates f at ((z + )
i ; a contradiction. This concludes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: f (t
By strategy-proofness of f , f is strategy-proof and since
which coincides with the value of
Thus, f (t
This concludes the proof of Step 2. Putting together Step 1 and Step 2, we have shown that f (t) = F (t). 
where the second equality in both statements follow from the strategy-proofness of f :
; which together with (7) implies that f (t) 2 fa m ; b m g: Thus, we have shown that if t is such that min
To show that f (t) = F (t); assume …rst that t is such that ev m (t) = 2 X m : By definition of F; F (t) = a m : Since ev m (t) = 2 X m ; by (8), f (0 Symmetrically, we can show that if t is such that ev
This …nishes the proof of Theorem 1.
Final remarks
As direct consequences of Theorem 1, Corollaries 1, 2 and 3 below characterize three relevant subclasses of strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Anonymity and e¢ ciency
Corollaries 1 and 2 characterize two nested subclasses: the class of strategy-proof and anonymous SCFs (Corollary 1) and the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient SCFs (Corollary 2).
To state Corollary 1 we …rst need to translate the de…nitions of extreme votes and tie-breaking sets of M to the anonymous case. Consider the family of n + 1 …xed ballots 0 p n ::: p 1 p 0 1 associated to a median voter scheme and let m 2 M: The set of pro…les at which the median voter scheme will select d m is e D m = ft = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 SSP n j medft 1 ; :::; t n ; p n ; :::
By anonymity, we only need to track the number of agents with tops strictly below, equal, and strictly above d m . Hence, for each t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 SSP n ; de…ne the triple 
j (x; y; z) e m (l < ; l = ; l > ) for some (x; y; z) 2 e Y m g: 
Given a family of discontinuity jumps I = fI m g m2M we say that f e X m g m2M is an anonymous family of tie-breaking sets of M if for all m 2 M , e X m L( e D m ) and e X m = U ( e X m ).
De…nition 7 A SCF f : SSP n ! [0; 1] is a disturbed median if there exist:
(1) a family of n + 1 …xed ballots 0 p n ::: p 1 p 0 1;
(2) a family of discontinuity jumps I = fI m g m2M compatible with p n ; :::; p 1 ; p 0 ; and (3) an anonymous family of tie-breaking sets f e X m g m2M of M
such that, for all t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 SSP n , f (t) = ( I (medft 1 ; :::; t n ; p n ; :::; p 0 g) if medft 1 ; :::; t n ; p n ; :::; p 0 g 6 = d m for all m 2 M g e Xm (t 1 ; :::; t n ) if medft 1 ; :::; t n ; p n ; :::; p 0 g = d m for an m 2 M:
1] is strategy-proof and anonymous if and only if it is a disturbed median.
Corollary 2 A SCF f : SSP n ! [0; 1] is strategy-proof, anonymous, and e¢ cient if and only if it is a median voter scheme with the property that p n = 0 and p 0 = 1.
E¢ ciency requires that f respects unanimity and hence, r f = [0; 1]. Thus, (i) its associated family of n+1 …xed ballots has the property that 0 = p n p n 1 ::: p 0 = 1 and (ii) the family of discontinuity sets M is empty. Observe that since p n = 0 and p 0 = 1 they cancel each other out in the computation of the median at any pro…le t and therefore, the generalized median voter scheme can also be described as the median of the n tops and the n 1 …xed ballots p n 1 ::: p 1 . This corresponds to Moulin (1980) 's characterization of the class of strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient SCFs on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Thus, the reduction of the domain does not generate in this case new strategy-proof, anonymous and e¢ cient SCFs.
Feasibility constraints
Our result has important implications for the design of strategy-proof SCFs on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences under feasibility constraints. Often, some subsets of alternatives (although conceivable) can not be chosen due to feasibility constraints. Then, discontinuities are compulsory rather than pathological because discontinuity jumps on the range of strategy-proof SCFs are necessary. Our result precisely describes their nature and how the strategy-proof SCF may select its value at these discontinuity points. However, if f is a strategy-proof and discontinuous SCF then, r f ( [0; 1] and hence, f will not be e¢ cient; in particular, f will not respect unanimity.
SCFs that are not e¢ cient but they are e¢ cient relative to the feasible set of alternatives are specially interesting. Thus, let A ( [0; 1] be a closed set of feasible alternatives. Note that the requirement r f = A imposes certain conditions on the monotonic family of …xed ballots fp S g S22 N and on the discontinuity jumps. For instance p N = minfx 2 Ag, p ? = maxfx 2 Ag and p S 2 A for all S 2 2 N : Moreover since A is closed the set To proceed with the illustration and in order to design a particular strategy-proof and anonymous SCF f whose range r f be equal to A let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of agents and let p 3 = p 2 = 0 and p 1 = p 0 = 0:9 be the family of four …xed ballots. In this particular case the ballots cancel each other and hence, for all (t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) 2 SSP 3 , medft 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ; 0; 0; 0:9; 0:9g = medft 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 g. For each discontinuity point d m the set L( e D m ) consists of four triplets: L( e D m ) = f(1; 2; 0); (0; 3; 0); (1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g where for example, the triplet (1; 2; 0) means that one top is strictly below d m and the remaining two tops are exactly equal to d m . Note, that in all the four cases the median of the tops coincides with d m , and hence all the pro…les of tops that are represented by L( e D m ) result in discontinuity points. Moreover, and since L( e D 1 ) = L( e D 2 ) = L( e D 3 ), e 1 = e 2 = e 3 as well. Denote it by e 0 and observe that (1; 2; 0) e 0 (1; 1; 1) e 0 (0; 2; 1), (1; 2; 0) e 0 (0; 3; 0) e 0 (0; 2; 1) and that (1; 1; 1) and (0; 3; 0) are not comparable by e 0 . To assign a value to the SCF on these discontinuity points preserving the monotonicity of the SCF f we need to select for each d m a tie- 20 Remember that, by Lemma 2, strategy-proof SCFs have a closed range.
breaking set e X m such that e X m = U ( e X m ): Given L( e D m ), there are six di¤erent ways of doing so: e X m 2 f;; f(0; 2; 1)g; f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; f(0; 3; 0); (0; 2; 1)g; f(1; 1; 1; ); (0; 3; 0); (0; 2; 1)g; L( e D m )g: For instance, choose e X 1 = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; e X 2 = f(0; 2; 1)g; and e X 3 = L( e D m ). Thus, the disturbed median f that we may de…ne applying De…nition 7 to the family of four …xed ballots 0 = p 3 = p 2 < p 1 = p 0 = 0:9, the family of discontinuity jumps I 1 = (0; 0:1); I 2 = (0:1; 0:2); and I 3 = (0:8; 0:9); and the anonymous family of tie-breaking sets e X 1 = f(1; 1; 1); (0; 2; 1)g; e X 2 = f(0; 2; 1)g; and e X 3 = L( e D 3 ) has range equal to A and it is e¢ cient relative to A: The disturbed median f could also be de…ned as follows. For all t = (t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ) 2 SSP 3 , and after setting y medft 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 g; The complexity of this description indicates the usefulness of Theorem 1's characterization.
Finally, by Remark 1, the four statements above (Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1, 2 and 3) also hold after replacing strategy-proofness by group strategy-proofness.
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